‘Why Putin’s Three-Day May Ceasefire Declaration is Worthless’

Since I last wrote here, a period of relative quiet in Kyiv was brutally interrupted by one of the worst Russian missile and drone attacks on the city during the entire full-scale invasion.

I’d gone to bed on 24 April with an air raid alert still in place—pretty much a nightly occurrence as air defences tackle the hundreds of kamikaze drones Russia sends over each day—and was woken around 1am as the familiar distant boom sounded.

But then, about 30 minutes later, a series of incredibly loud explosions made very clear that this wasn’t just drones but missiles as well.

Twelve people were killed in Kyiv, and 87 others injured, including six children.

“Russian peace in all its glory” was how Kyiv City Military Administration chief Tymur Tkachenko described it.

And so the war drags on even as we pass the first 100 days of US President Donald Trump‘s second term, a duration he had insisted would be enough to bring peace to Ukraine.

While that still seems a long way off from here, there have been some relatively positive developments. 

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Minerals Deal

Well, it finally happened — the US and Ukraine signed the long-awaited minerals deal.

The top line is positive — regardless of the details of the deal — the signing marks a massive step in the resetting of relations between Kyiv and Washington after a rollercoaster few months.

It wasn’t that long ago that Trump was accusing President Volodymyr Zelensky of being a “dictator”, accusing him of starting the war, and temporarily cutting off military aid after that infamous Oval Office showdown.

So there was a bit of a sigh of relief in Kyiv when the deal was signed. But what about the details? It’s mixed news.

On the plus side, the deal does not contain some of the things in previous iterations that were viewed as incredibly exploitative of Ukraine, and gives Kyiv full control over its land, infrastructure, and resources, as well as not applying to existing projects.

Another major win is that it won’t force Ukraine to pay back the US for the billions in aid it has sent since the start of the full-scale invasion, something Trump made a regular talking point of.

It also contains language that will allow it to be altered if it interferes with Ukraine’s accession to the European Union.

Earlier versions gave privileged access to Ukraine’s resources to the US over its European allies which raised alarm bells on the continent.

And what about the negatives? It still doesn’t contain concrete US security guarantees to deter Russian aggression in the future which is Ukraine’s main concern.

Trump still appears to believe that increased US business investment in Ukraine, with American companies on the ground after a ceasefire is achieved, is enough, and negates the need for any sort of NATO Article 5-like agreement.

But whether or not the deal will actually lead to America’s private sector investing in Ukraine remains to be seen — two further documents containing more details on this have not yet been made public so there are still many unanswered questions about the long-term viability of the deal.

But still, in the short-to-medium term, this was always more about resetting the  relationship between two presidents and keeping the White House on Ukraine’s side as the war drags on.

Which takes us to…

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The Vatican

I’m sure you’ve all seen the photo already — Trump and Zelensky deep in conversation at the Vatican after the Pope’s funeral.

Zelensky reportedly used the 15-minute chat to urge Trump to take a harder line on Russian President Vladimir Putin, as well as push for a complete ceasefire in Ukraine rather than the partial ones the Kremlin is floating.

And it seems to have worked at least in part — commenting after the meeting on the mass-missile attack on Kyiv, Trump said: “It makes me think that maybe he doesn’t want to stop the war, he’s just tapping me along, and has to be dealt with differently, through banking or secondary sanctions?” 

But a note of caution is needed. One Ukrainian lawmaker told me the meeting was “symbolic” but didn’t go as far as describing it as positive because “nothing concrete” was agreed upon.

Indeed, the possible sanctions Trump mentioned have yet to materialise, but there’s still time. 

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The Ceasefire

Putin announced a “humanitarian” three-day ceasefire to mark the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II in Europe, the Kremlin said on April 28, a headline that was reported uncritically across the world when it happened.

But there’s a major issue — this isn’t how you declare ceasefires.

One side can’t just unilaterally declare a ceasefire, they require intense negotiations between both sides, and the agreement of various terms.

The Kremlin’s announcement was sparse on details, only saying it would apply from midnight on May 8 until midnight on May 11, and that “during this period, all military actions will cease”.

“Russia believes that the Ukrainian side should follow this example”, it added.

I asked retired Australian Army Mick Ryan what was missing. He said:

1. Ceasefires have to be negotiated so both sides agree on terms. Otherwise neither is bound by them. 
2. ⁠They need clear terms. What do they apply to and what don’t they apply to? These need to be verifiable. 
3. ⁠There is a time component. How long does it last? 
4. What are monitoring arrangements to ensure ceasefire is adhered to and how are violations dealt with? 
5. Finally, what is the purpose of the ceasefire? Is it limited so both sides can collect casualties, or is it something bigger that is designed to provide time for detailed negotiations on war termination?

In short, Russia’s ceasefires declarations are worthless.

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Russian Mobilisation

Something that wasn’t widely reported but which could potentially be very significant were comments from Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov on 30 April about Russian mobilisation.

Before we get into what he said, there’s a really important thing you need to know about the Russian armed forces — Russia essentially has two armies, a conscript army and a contract army.

The conscripted army are the standing forces that are ostensibly there to defend Russia itself. 

Moscow has two waves of conscription each year, one in spring, and another in autumn, and it applies to all citizens aged 18 to 30.

By law, conscripts aren’t allowed to be sent to fight wars on foreign soil, which obviously isn’t very useful for the Kremlin when it wants to find men to fight in Ukraine.

Conscripts also hold a special place in Russian society — groups representing the mothers of conscripts are one of the only civil society groups that Putin is actually sensitive to, and can sow discontent in the wider population.

This has meant the Kremlin has had to rely on its contract army to fight in Ukraine — enticing men to sign up with the promise of cold, hard cash.

So in short, Russian society has no issues with men being sent to die when it’s their choice, but when they’re forced by the state to do so, things get tricky for the Kremlin.

This was evident in September 2022 when Moscow announced a “partial mobilisation” that prompted the only mass demonstrations in Russia against the full-scale invasion during the entire war (though it should be noted people were protesting about being sent to fight, not about the war itself).

Since then, the Kremlin has been very careful to make clear that no more mobilisations would occur — until this week.

Speaking at a lecture in Moscow, Peskov said Russia can mobilise for war on a scale comparable to the Soviet Union during World War II if necessary “at any moment”.

“If a great country needs to stand up, it will stand up at any moment. No one can have any doubts”, he said, marking a notable change in tone on the issue.

Now this comes with the caveat that Peskov talks a lot of rubbish, a lot of the time, just like anyone associated with the Kremlin.

But it could potentially mark a significant change in the narrative over mobilisation and is definitely worth keeping an eye on.