‘Russia Will Be Hungry for More if Europe Doesn’t Unite to Protect Ukraine’

Few observers of world politics and European politics have failed to notice the European Union’s recent intense activities in the area of defence and security. The reason for this striking development is not difficult to divine.

The United States has largely abandoned its significant role after World War II as a guarantor of world peace most vividly illustrated by the Trump administration’s devastating decisions to revoke its long-standing commitment to military and economic support of Ukraine in a bid to claim friendlier relationships with the Kremlin.

While European countries were largely taken by surprise by these turbulent geopolitical developments, there has been a rarely witnessed determination by the EU Member States and significant allies like the UK and Canada to prepare for a defence of Europe and Ukraine without the contribution of the US.

For most European countries and the EU, the support of Ukraine is also widely considered fundamental and nearly existential for the European integration project as Ukraine’s application for EU Membership has been put on a speed track amidst the current war against Russia. 

In terms of defence expenditure, Member States reached in 2024 a record investment of €326 billion, but the latest estimates indicate that at least €500 billion will be needed to plug the EU’s critical capability gaps over the next decade. 

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen presented a five-point plan last week on how to rearm the continent, detailing how to mobilise up to €800 billion over the coming years.

The key technical elements of the  Rearm European plan are twofold: to activate the national escape clause and ensure Member States can increase defence expenditure without breaching the EU Stability and Growth Pact. For example: If Member States would increase their defence spending by 1,5% of GDP on average this could create fiscal space of close to EUR 650 billion over a period of four years.

The second key point of the plan is to launch a new EU instrument which will provide €150 billion of loans to Member States for defence investment addressing specifically pan-European capability domains including air and missile defence, artillery systems, missiles and ammunition drones and anti-drone systems; but also, to address other needs from cyber to military mobility for example.

The thinking behind this this is effective streamlined joint purchase/public procurement of equipment by Member States which could then massively step up military support to Ukraine.

Within these initiatives, as reaffirmed by recent European Council conclusions, contain a commitment by the European Investment Bank to step up its support for Europe’s security and defence industry and further measures by the Commission to enhance private investment in the defence industry.

The Commission’s White Paper on the Future of European defence, which was presented this week by Von Der Leyen and the EU’s top diplomat Kaja Kallas, also encourages Member States to spend more, better and European.

The ultimate goal of simplifying rules, cutting red tape, and promoting more joint purchases and production is to create a true European single market for defence, addressing the long-standing fragmentation of a predominantly national-focused market (White Paper). 

The EU’s rearmament plan is impossible to disconnect from the European countries’ desperate attempts to provide Ukraine with the necessary military and financial support to stave off the Russian threat.

The recent EUCO conclusions on Ukraine endorsed the general notion of  “peace through strength” framing suggesting that Ukraine needs to be in the strongest possible position in terms of military and defence capabilities to negotiate a peace deal with Russia.

To that end, the EU remains committed, in coordination with like-minded partners and allies like the UK and Canada, to provide enhanced political, financial, economic, humanitarian, military and diplomatic support to Ukraine and its people encompassing notably the provision of air defence systems, ammunition and missiles and the provision of necessary training and equipment for Ukrainian brigades.

One of the key undertakings here is that the Member States and like-minded allies committed to contribute to security guarantees based on their respective competences and capabilities. The last point is fundamentally a game-changer as “security guarantees” are basically referring to troop reinforcement or peace-keeping troops.

Another significant point here is that the EU institutions and the Member States also foresee a clear role for other non-EU countries like Britain in the process of addressing these highly complex security challenges. The contributions of the UK to a European defence policy and rearmament is particularly notable as Britain is generally recognised as one of the world’s strongest military forces . 

Undoubtedly, there are reasons to both applaud and be wary of these developments.

The central normative argument in support of the EU’s rearmament plan is that this type of defence spending and commitments are needed to hold the stand against Russia in light of a pressing threat of further war and territorial incursions by the Kremlin.

From this perspective, Ukraine is the military frontier against a highly aggressive and expansionist Russia which — if successful in Ukraine and amidst US withdrawal from NATO — might be interested in a broader expansion into Eastern Europe reclaiming its former satellite states.

While all this seems implausible at first sight, it cannot be excluded that the Kremlin will be hungry for more if they can show that illegal aggression will go unsanctioned by the US and other Western allies. To my mind, this argument is sufficiently compelling to “trump” other considerations. 

Nonetheless, there are other arguments in play here. It is readily apparent that there is no EU military as such or common defence policy as the Union lacks such powers at this stage suggesting that military aid, troop reinforcements, weapons supplies, and training must consequently come from European states.

It is equally clear that the EU has no competencies to direct defence spending in the EU Member States. Increasing defence spending and loosening financial rules in this field will thus also need to come from state initiatives.

Although several states, notably Germany, Poland, UK and France have indicated that they are willing to significantly increase defence spending, there are still many unknown variables in terms of securing the resources needed to reach the stated goal of 800 billion stated by Von Der Leyen and Kallas.

Furthermore, although there are indications that UK, France and other allies could send peace-keeping troops to uphold a potential ceasefire deal with Russia, it seems implausible that such troops would be sent to Ukraine unless there is some at least tacit acceptance by the Kremlin of the deal.

There is also on a broader scale, more limited public support for more defence spending and military deployment among Europeans. Deploying European troops in Ukraine might also leave the Baltic States and Poland without serious protection. 

To conclude; the EU rearmament plan is a very welcome development in terms of addressing the highly dangerous current geopolitical climate but there are many challenges in implementing the plan in practice — in particular that the plan relies heavily on joint support and unity from individual EU Member States and other allies.

Negotiations on the plan among European states will be complex, costly and politically challenging.

At the end of the day there is, however, no compelling alternative — if Europeans do not come together on this, we can envisage a significant expansion by the Kremlin and a potentially much larger conflict on the European continent.

Morally, we also owe the Ukrainian people a large debt for keeping Russian forces at bay and protecting our European continent. We must repay this debt.