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Few observers of world politics and European politics have failed to notice the European Union’s recent intense activities in the area of defence and security. The reason for this striking development is not difficult to divine.
The United States has largely abandoned its significant role after World War II as a guarantor of world peace most vividly illustrated by the Trump administration’s devastating decisions to revoke its long-standing commitment to military and economic support of Ukraine in a bid to claim friendlier relationships with the Kremlin.
While European countries were largely taken by surprise by these turbulent geopolitical developments, there has been a rarely witnessed determination by the EU Member States and significant allies like the UK and Canada to prepare for a defence of Europe and Ukraine without the contribution of the US.
For most European countries and the EU, the support of Ukraine is also widely considered fundamental and nearly existential for the European integration project as Ukraine’s application for EU Membership has been put on a speed track amidst the current war against Russia.
In terms of defence expenditure, Member States reached in 2024 a record investment of €326 billion, but the latest estimates indicate that at least €500 billion will be needed to plug the EU’s critical capability gaps over the next decade.
European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen presented a five-point plan last week on how to rearm the continent, detailing how to mobilise up to €800 billion over the coming years.
The key technical elements of the Rearm European plan are twofold: to activate the national escape clause and ensure Member States can increase defence expenditure without breaching the EU Stability and Growth Pact. For example: If Member States would increase their defence spending by 1,5% of GDP on average this could create fiscal space of close to EUR 650 billion over a period of four years.
The second key point of the plan is to launch a new EU instrument which will provide €150 billion of loans to Member States for defence investment addressing specifically pan-European capability domains including air and missile defence, artillery systems, missiles and ammunition drones and anti-drone systems; but also, to address other needs from cyber to military mobility for example.
The thinking behind this this is effective streamlined joint purchase/public procurement of equipment by Member States which could then massively step up military support to Ukraine.
Within these initiatives, as reaffirmed by recent European Council conclusions, contain a commitment by the European Investment Bank to step up its support for Europe’s security and defence industry and further measures by the Commission to enhance private investment in the defence industry.
The Commission’s White Paper on the Future of European defence, which was presented this week by Von Der Leyen and the EU’s top diplomat Kaja Kallas, also encourages Member States to spend more, better and European.
The ultimate goal of simplifying rules, cutting red tape, and promoting more joint purchases and production is to create a true European single market for defence, addressing the long-standing fragmentation of a predominantly national-focused market (White Paper).
The EU’s rearmament plan is impossible to disconnect from the European countries’ desperate attempts to provide Ukraine with the necessary military and financial support to stave off the Russian threat.
The recent EUCO conclusions on Ukraine endorsed the general notion of “peace through strength” framing suggesting that Ukraine needs to be in the strongest possible position in terms of military and defence capabilities to negotiate a peace deal with Russia.
To that end, the EU remains committed, in coordination with like-minded partners and allies like the UK and Canada, to provide enhanced political, financial, economic, humanitarian, military and diplomatic support to Ukraine and its people encompassing notably the provision of air defence systems, ammunition and missiles and the provision of necessary training and equipment for Ukrainian brigades.
One of the key undertakings here is that the Member States and like-minded allies committed to contribute to security guarantees based on their respective competences and capabilities. The last point is fundamentally a game-changer as “security guarantees” are basically referring to troop reinforcement or peace-keeping troops.
Another significant point here is that the EU institutions and the Member States also foresee a clear role for other non-EU countries like Britain in the process of addressing these highly complex security challenges. The contributions of the UK to a European defence policy and rearmament is particularly notable as Britain is generally recognised as one of the world’s strongest military forces .
Undoubtedly, there are reasons to both applaud and be wary of these developments.
The central normative argument in support of the EU’s rearmament plan is that this type of defence spending and commitments are needed to hold the stand against Russia in light of a pressing threat of further war