‘Keir Starmer Has Missed His Chance to Make a Bold Break With the Past on Foreign Policy’

As we approach the one-year anniversary of the Labour Government’s election, it’s worth looking at how it has performed on foreign policy.

It’s important to recognise first of all that it entered office at an extraordinarily difficult time  – a raging war in Europe, the most serious since World War 2, a Middle East on fire, a weak global economy,  rising competition from China, military coups across Africa, renewed fighting in hotspots such as Sudan and Burma, and the growing problems of climate change and mass migration.

Democracies worldwide are struggling to coordinate effective strategies on these challenges whilst simultaneously battling headwinds at home, including authoritarianism, populism, polarisation, misinformation, and culture wars.

Keir Starmer’s Government inherited a particularly weak hand domestically, due to years of underfunding by previous governments in public services, infrastructure, and the military, growing pressure on the health and social care sectors, and the festering consequences of Brexit.

Add to that the return of the mercurial Donald Trump to the White House, pursuing an “America First” policy, launching trade wars, threatening land grabs from former partners such as Canada, and Denmark, and casting doubt on his commitment to core alliances such as NATO, and the international rules-based order, and any government would be hard pressed to achieve significant results.

But, on the back of its stunning election victory in July 2024, alongside growing evidence that most British people now regret Brexit, this difficult environment also presented the new Labour Government with an opportunity to pursue a bold reset of British foreign policy – one less dependent on the US, more realigned with European partners, and more consistent with the UK’s commitment to international law.

Instead, the Labour Government, perhaps shaped by Starmer’s natural caution, has pursued a relatively timid, unambitious, foreign policy course, marked in some cases by inconsistency, and, in other cases, by moral failure.     

Speaking in January 2025, six months after becoming Foreign Secretary, David Lammy described his approach as one of, “Progressive Realism. Taking the world as it is, not as we wish it to be. Advancing progressive ends by realist means.” 

This strikes me as a clever catch-all phrase which allows the government to justify almost any foreign policy decision, splitting the difference between a pragmatic, narrow, approach, or a more liberal/progressive one based on international law and values. It neatly absolves the government from making absolute hard choices.

Top Marks on Ukraine

If I was to grade the government’s performance in some of the highest profile areas, I would give the strongest mark, an A, for its work on Ukraine/Russia – where it has sustained strong support for Ukraine, and firm opposition to Russian aggression.

This has involved working closely with both European and American partners, including through playing a pivotal role in preventing a complete rupture between the US and Ukraine after the disastrous Trump-Zelensky Oval Office meeting in February, and stepping in to backfill for closed US AID programmes in Ukraine.

It is probably no coincidence that this has also been the easiest policy politically, since British support for Ukraine remains high, straddles the mainstream political divide, and conveniently exposes a weak point for Nigal Farage and Reform. Whatever the motives, Britain’s contribution on Ukraine/Russia continues to be real, substantive, and impactful.

Trying Relations with Trump

I give the Government a B+ for its handling of relations with the US. Given their differing temperaments, character, and backgrounds, it is no mean feat for Starmer to have achieved what appears to be a genuine rapport with Trump. This has produced substantive results, for example, as in Starmer’s mediation on Ukraine, successful preservation of the AUKUS security deal, which some in Trump’s administration had wanted to unravel, and US backing for the Diego Garcia deal.

It’s been unedifying to see Starmer sucking up to Trump, wooing him with a second State Visit, and exaggerating the “historic” nature of the recent UK-US trade deal. But, no British Prime Minister can afford to break completely with a US President, even one as unpopular as Trump, given the UK’s security dependency on the US.

However, the need to keep UK-US relations smooth has meant Starmer keeping his head down when US policy has clashed strongly with UK interests, for example, when Trump has repeated his absurd ambitions to annex Canada, take Greenland, or develop Gaza as a holiday resort. The rush to be the first to cut a trade deal with the US may also cost the UK in the long run, if other countries see where the US bottom lines are, and aim higher.

Trump respects strength. Starmer risks looking like a pushover. Perhaps he has no option but to tread with extreme care, given Trump’s volatility. But, given the risk that Trump’s administration may not be an aberration, it is unclear if the UK establishment has yet recognised the need to reduce dependency on the US. While the most recent NATO summit seems to have reaffirmed US engagement in Europe for now, the US security guarantee for Europe can no longer be taken for granted.

Moving Faster on Defence

I give the government only a B on NATO and defence, despite the UK’s strong role on Ukraine. Precisely because of the turbulent international scene, and the risk of US disengagement, the UK needs to move faster to rebuild its atrophied military.

We currently have the lowest number of serving professional soldiers since the Napoleonic era, who would not even fill a US football stadium. The UK has agreed to a modest target of achieving 2.5% GDP expenditure on defence by 2027; 3% by the next parliament; and the new NATO target of 5% by 2035, but it is unclear where the money for this will come from.

Some has come at the expense of a reduction in the UK aid budget, which is like robbing Peter to pay Paul. For example, in his January speech, Lammy singled out conflict prevention and overseas development work, both traditionally funded by UK Aid, as playing an important role in reducing the amount of illegal migration to our shores.   

Resetting Relations With the EU

On UK-EU relations I give the government a C, or even a C-, because the much heralded “reset” of UK-EU relations announced in May fell short of what was necessary, desirable or achievable, given the size of the government’s majority, evolving public attitudes on Brexit, and changing geopolitical environment.

The EU remains overwhelmingly the UK’s most important economic partner. No new trade deals with the US, India, or other countries can compensate for the reduction in trade with the EU due to Brexit. If economic growth is truly Starmer’s priority as he has repeatedly declared, and is also essential to fund our military ambitions, this cannot be achieved without pursuing a more ambitious reset with the EU.  

Genuine progress was achieved – for example, to ease trade on animal and plant products through new phyto-sanitary arrangements, on youth mobility, energy, electricity, crime and migration, and to establish more structured security and defence cooperation. But UK redlines, for example on the European Court of Justice, and Freedom of Movement, limited what was achievable. The reset paves the way for more progress in the future, but was not a game-changer.

Some of this hesitancy appears to stem from fear of a domestic backlash from lingering eurosceptic parts of the electorate, including the famous Red Wall voters, and the right-wing press, which instantly portrays any deal with the EU as a “sellout”.

But, Starmer’s government also appears trapped in the mindset of its predecessors – that the UK “deserves” special treatment from the EU, or should be able to cherry pick areas of cooperation.

The government also seems scared to make a strong positive case for better UK-EU relations to the public, which allows the terms of debate to be set mainly by the Eurosceptics.

It was noticeable that Starmer felt obliged to emphasise what the UK “got” “from” the EU, while EU leaders such as Commission President Ursula von der Leyen spoke about what was achieved “with” the UK.

If the lens is widened to cover UK-Europe relations beyond the EU, I give the government higher marks – a B -, since Starmer has undoubtedly transformed the tone of relations with European partners, from one of suspicious frostiness and disdain under the Conservatives, to one of renewed trust and warmth.

This was evident right from the moment when Starmer hosted the European Political Community summit at Blenheim palace immediately after the election last July, and has continued in the atmospherics of numerous meetings with European leaders since then. The UK’s sustained support for Ukraine, enduring commitment to NATO, and conclusion of various bilateral deals with European countries have all played a role.

The Middle East Mess

I award the lowest grade – a D – to the UK’s approach on the Middle East, which seems characterised more by a strong desire for the whole issue to go away, than by any clear idea of UK interests or principles. How else to explain the UK Government’s continuing reluctance to condemn definitively the Netanyahu government over its repeated violations of international humanitarian law, tantamount to war crimes, in Gaza.

In a recent interview with the BBC, the UK Attorney General, Lord Richard Hermer, claimed that international law “goes to the very heart” of Starmer’s approach on foreign policy. But, this is manifestly not the case when it comes to Israel, where the UK continues to mince its words, and allows it to get away with behaviour it regularly denounces in other contexts, for example, Russian bombing of civilians in Ukraine.

In his speech, Lammy emphasised the importance of forging “closer partnerships with the Global South”, yet, the UK risks destroying its credibility with countries like these, for whom the Israel/Palestinian issue is a major concern, by applying double standards towards the situation.  

Occasionally, Trump in his unorthodox way blurts out a truth – as he did when he lambasted both Iran and Israel for continuing to trade fire. He said: “We basically have two countries that have been fighting so long and so hard that they don’t know what the f— they’re doing.” 

I feel his criticism could equally be applied to countries outside the region, including the UK, who continue to mouth support for a two state solution, alongside Israel’s right to exist, and issue ritual denunciations of Iran, having long ago lost sight of how we got here, of what might be a plausible way forward.  

This begs wider questions. Has UK foreign policy become to bogged down in traditional thinking? How does the government square its progressive international goals, with its Reform-adjacent rhetoric on immigration and foreign aid.

How does it square “clear eyed realism” with its continued denial of the Trump administration’s growing disregard for international laws, institutions, and norms. How does it grow our economy, and raise enough money for public services and the military, while remaining locked behind self-imposed redlines on the EU. How does it maintain international credibility, while applying double standards in cases like Israel?

Perhaps the recently issued national security review will resolve some of these inconsistencies. But no amount of clever wording will cover for actual decisions in the moment.

The government’s overall approach seems driven less by any clear strategy or overarching vision, but by a pragmatic desire to avoid pitfalls on a case-by-case basis, avoid clear stances on controversial issues, and avoid antagonising key constituencies at home or abroad. Perhaps this is what the government means by “realism.” But it’s not progressive.