Keir Starmer’s ‘Geo-Political Minefield’ Between Donald Trump and Europe

That fabled ‘special relationship’ between the United States and United Kingdom. How much substance can be attributed to it in the post-1945 international order possessing, as they do, intertwined defence capabilities?

And more to the point, what role can a British Prime Minister realistically carve out moving forward, given the volatile nature of the current Trump White House?

UK-US Pairings 

Since the 1940s there have been some unlikely pairings of British Prime Ministers and US Presidents. That between Winston Churchill and Franklin D Roosevelt was iconic, though it took Pear Harbour for the Americans to be drawn into a global apocalypse against fascism.

Ironically, given what many think is the predisposition of Donald Trump, they became parties — along with Joseph Stalin — to carving up territorial spheres of influence.

Of course, thereafter we saw rapid decline of Britain as a power broker, through the devastation inflicted on the country by World War Two and the dissolution of empire.

In the special relationship, British Prime Ministers were increasingly depicted as supplicants to overweening American Presidents, brought home during the Suez debacle in 1956, when lack of American support during Dwight D Eisenhower’s presidency pulled the rug from under Anthony Eden’s ill-judged escapade. 

These changing power dynamics induced that widely quoted comment from former US Secretary of State, Dean Acheson: “Great Britain has lost an empire and has not yet found a role.” That sentiment proved a catalyst for a much closer UK relationship with Europe, until badly shattered by the 2016 in-out EU referendum. Nonetheless, there have been fascinating inter-personal relationships either side of the Atlantic. 

An example was the surprising warmth between Harold Macmillan and John F Kennedy in the early 1960s, despite their respective Conservative and Democrat affiliations.

Conversely, there were tensions between Harold Wilson and Lyndon B Johnson over Vietnam in the late 1960s, notwithstanding similar political values. The affinity between Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan in the 1980s defined an era, widely regarded as instrumental in the fall of the Berlin Wall and end of the Cold War between the West and the Soviet Union.

Which brings us on to more recent decades and perhaps the most damaging relationship between a British Prime Minister and American President, that between Tony Blair and George W Bush, when the former supported what was widely perceived to be a premeditated US invasion of Iraq in 2003, on what turned out to be spurious grounds. It generated deep friction with European allies.

Trump’s International Disorder

So, to the fractious return of Trump to the White House in January 2025, with dilemmas presented for Keir Starmer’s Premiership, the success of which had hitherto been regarded as hinging on domestic reform, following damage to public services and much else under previous Conservative administrations.

Contrary pulls and pushes from a US presidency and European leaders now present even more of a minefield in the shifting sands of a brutal ongoing armed conflict between Vladimir Putin’s Russian Federation and Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s former Soviet Republic of Ukraine.

This was all encapsulated by one of the most dramatic weeks in international affairs — those seven days from 24 February to 2 March 2025. The visit of Emmanuel Macron to the White House, followed by Starmer’s bilateral where he pressed all of Trump’s sweet spots, interpreted in some quarters as re-enacting a supplicant relationship. Then the unedifying spectacle in front of TV cameras of a bust up in the Oval Office as Trump and JD Vance lined up against Zelenskyy.   

Next, Starmer’s restoration of Zelenskyy’s dignity in Downing Street, precursor to the Lancaster House defence summit involving European and NATO leaders and Turkey — Canada too, almost emerging as a surrogate transatlantic relationship. Led by the British Prime Minister, he stepped into the vacuum of ruptured relationships over a Ukrainian peace negotiation. 

That revived the lauded contention, substantive or otherwise, of the UK as a diplomatic ‘bridge’ between the US and Europe. The word from Downing Street was that Starmer had a rapport with Trump who was willing to engage in a way that did not apply to the EU. The alternative option canvassed was for Europe to go it alone, by-passing Trump altogether. 

That alternative raises three conundrums. It plays further into Putin’s hands. Also, there are important benefits to Ukraine’s invasion resistance from, already paused, invaluable American military hardware, logistics and intelligence. Nor is there any immediate prospect of Europe becoming self-sufficient for defence purposes. Thirdly, a US turned into European adversary has implications not only for security but also for the material well-being of all citizens.

Starmer’s Geo-Political Minefield

This provides the startling context for Starmer’s collaborative efforts to make progress on a viable plan for a Ukrainian peace initiative. The pertinent question is whether there is any conceivable way of spanning policy divergence between Trump’s White House and European capitals.         

What remains particularly problematic are Trump’s underlying motives. The seductive power of Putin is explained in some quarters by alleged earlier grooming on the part of the Soviet intelligence community, or by other compromising material held in the Kremlin.

There is Trump’s natural affinity with authoritarian leaders, envious of their untrammelled power. Maybe he calculates he can detach Russia from China, though that seems a forlorn hope. He is also nakedly transactional in wanting to capitalise on the benefits of an enforced Ukrainian deal without incurring any of the costs.

Personal grudges against Zelenskyy go back to his first Presidency. Then again, Trump may simply be in a rush to secure himself a Nobel Peace Prize, jealous as he is of Barack Obama’s award. Such can be the driving forces behind transparently narcissistic leaders.

Given his former intelligence associations, there is less mystery around Putin’s deep-rooted psychology, centred on the humiliation with which he regards the implosion of the Soviet Union and his corresponding neo-imperialist dreams. That makes it hard to see how he can make any significant concessions without abandoning cherished goals.

Moreover, Trump seems oblivious (or perhaps he just doesn’t care) to the political darkness into which Russia has progressively fallen during Putin’s ascendancy, chillingly documented by the BBC journalist, Sarah Rainsford, in Goodbye to Russia.

With these seemingly insurmountable obstacles in mind, Starmer has been accused of hedging his bets over unavoidable strategic choices. The conflicting interests of Trump’s America and those vital to Europe, improved relationships with which Starmer has studiously prioritised since becoming Prime Minister in July 2024, look increasingly irreconcilable.

Is he allowing hollow sentimentality to cloud his judgement? Or given the enormous stakes involved is he, along with Macron, justified in continuing to pursue transatlantic diplomacy to avoid a permanent damaging breach from the United States with untold consequences? 

In this rapidly evolving situation, what we are left with is an intriguing historical comparison. That between Blair staking his authority on reckless American leadership and Starmer galvanising the cause of Ukrainian and wider European security, filling a void of authority opened by a capricious ‘America First’ White House prone to unilateral decision making. That especially applies if the long cherished special relationship finally finishes up on the funeral pyre of Trump’s personal machinations.