‘Ukraine’s Kursk Offensive is Vladimir Putin’s Emperor Has No Clothes Moment’

Ukraine’s cross-border offensive in Russia’s Kursk region has once again demonstrated Kyiv’s ability to humiliate Moscow and inflict severe losses on its military.

The move – the first occupation of Russian territory since the Second World War – furthers suggestions that Russian President Vladimir Putin can neither achieve the goals of his so-called “special military operation” in the neighbouring country nor maintain control over Russian territory. So, what happens now?

Two months before Kyiv launched its military operation in western Russia, Putin made what he described as “another true peace proposal” to Ukraine. He urged Ukrainian leadership to recognise Moscow’s annexation of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhya, insisting on a full “demilitarisation and denasification” of the Eastern European country.

“Obviously, the realities on the ground and on the line of engagement will continue to change, and not in favour of the Kyiv regime,” Putin said. 

However, on August 6, the opposite happened. Ukrainian forces entered Russian territory, capturing several villages and towns in the Kursk region. Reports suggest that the Ukrainian military continues advancing, as Moscow has a hard time stabilising the front. 

As a result, now that the realities on the ground have shifted in favour of Ukraine, Dmitry Polyansky, the first Deputy Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations, has stated that Putin’s peace proposal is “no longer valid.” However, current developments in Kursk might force the Kremlin to make some concessions.

Following its “special military operation” on Russian soil, the Ukrainian military captured hundreds of Russian conscripts, as well as a large group of Chechen fighters, known as Kadyrovtsy, putting Putin in a difficult position.

Compulsory military service has long been a sensitive issue in Russia, which is why he repeatedly stated that he will not use any conscript soldiers in Ukraine.

In Chechnya, Putin has been buying Ramzan Kadyrov’s loyalty for decades and, in exchange, has secured relative peace in Russia’s restive region.

To preserve stability in Chechnya, and avoid potential protests of the parents of captured Russian conscripts, Putin will likely soon seek to negotiate a prison-of-war exchange with Kyiv. But given current realities on the ground, any future arrangement will almost certainly be on Ukraine’s terms. 

More importantly, if Ukrainian forces manage to occupy a Russian nuclear power plant at Kurchatov near Kursk, the Kremlin will likely seek to reach a “land swap” deal.

To reclaim the strategically important facility, Moscow might have to withdraw its troops from the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, and potentially even from parts of Ukraine’s Kharkiv region that are currently under Russian control. 

But negotiating a “land swap” with Russia was unlikely to be the major driver of Ukraine’s cross-border operation. Policymakers in Kyiv, firmly backed by the West, likely aimed to demonstrate that “the emperor has no clothes”, and that Putin’s Russia is much weaker than it appears.

The fact that the Russian leader labelled Ukraine’s action as a “large-scale provocation”, rather than an “invasion” or an “aggression”, indicates there is no political will in the Kremlin to initiate a general mobilisation. Rather, it appears, that Putin will continue taking half-measures aiming to find the way out of his Kursk debacle. 

Ukraine’s offensive has also shown that Putin’s warnings about Kyiv’s use of Western-supplied arms on Russia’s soil setting a “dangerous new path”, were empty threats.

Since Russia has not fired a single missile at Kyiv more than a week after Ukraine captured significant parts of the Kursk region, it seems improbable that it will fulfil its promise to strike the so-called decision-making centre in the Ukrainian capital in response.

If, however, Putin decides to order the Russian military to bomb administrative buildings in Kyiv, it will represent yet another sign of weakness, as such a move will not force Ukraine to withdraw from Western Russia.

Putin is on his own in this game. Moscow’s nominal allies, including Belarus, do not seem willing to get involved in the Ukraine war.

According to the Article 4 of the Russian-dominated Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), “an act of aggression (an armed attack that threatens security, stability, territorial integrity, and sovereignty) against one of the member states will be considered as a collective act of aggression on all member states of the CSTO”.

In other words, given that Ukraine openly attacked Russia – even though this was Kyiv’s response to the Russian invasion of the Eastern European country – the CSTO should have intervened. But it didn’t.

Moscow cannot count on its new ally, North Korea, either. Although in June Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un signed a strategic partnership pact that includes a mutual defence clause under which each country agrees to help the other repel external aggression, Pyong Yang remains silent over the developments in Kursk.  

Putin will, therefore, have a hard time finding a solution. What he will almost certainly do, is increase the level of repression at home by banning YouTube,  eliminating anonymity for bloggers, and arresting anyone who to dares to criticise his actions in Ukraine.

But none of that will help him save face. The Kursk fiasco could have severe long-term consequences for his rule.