Byline Times is an independent, reader-funded investigative newspaper, outside of the system of the established press, reporting on ‘what the papers don’t say’ – without fear or favour.
To support its work, subscribe to the monthly Byline Times print edition, packed with exclusive investigations, news, and analysis.
Crimea is the centrepiece of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and the flashpoint of the decade-long war the Kremlin ignited in 2014. Home of Russia’s coveted Black Sea Fleet, Moscow considers Crimea an “unsinkable aircraft carrier” and a nucleus of force projection for naval activities.
During the ongoing war in Ukraine, the prized fleet has been decimated, with one-third of its naval vessels either sunk or damaged.
Further high-value strikes against the fleet’s headquarters in Sevastopol were a strategic blow that ultimately led to the decision to withdraw the fleet from Crimea, further underscoring Russia’s invulnerability and Vladimir Putin’s strongman aura.
A Pretext for the Initial 2014 War
For hundreds of years, the Crimean Peninsula was a launching pad for Russian and, later, Soviet superiority in the Black Sea. When Ukraine gained independence under referendums and international law, Crimea was recognised as part of Kyiv’s sovereignty, which drew the ire of Moscow.
In the aftermath of Ukraine’s independence, the Kremlin signed a lease with the more pro-Russian Ukrainian Parliament to share access to naval bases in Sevastopol for the Black Sea Fleet.
In 2010, Ukraine’s Parliament erupted into blows as the pro-Russian President, Viktor Yanukovych, forwarded an extension of Russia’s naval lease in Crime – affirming Kyiv’s lack of sovereignty and setting the stage for the Maidan a few years later.
Yanukovych would be removed during the pro-democracy Maidan Revolution in 2014, which set off panic alarms in Moscow. Putin would order Russian special forces and seasoned Wagner paramilitaries to seize Crimea as unmarked “little green men”.
High-commanding FSB officers, led by internationally wanted MH-17 mastermind Igor Strelkov (Girkin), would immediately cease all military bases and capture swaths of Ukrainian military contingents in the peninsula. Pretending Crimea was “seceding”, Moscow would immediately illegally annex Crimea and reinforce the peninsula heavily for the next several years.
A Major Obstacle for Ukraine
Before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia could now hinder Ukraine’s freedom of movement in the Black Sea and seize what was left of naval assets. Using Crimea as a centrepiece of Russian naval expeditionary operations. Several ships of the Black Sea Fleet intervened in Syria – providing maritime support to Syrian government forces.
During the full-scale war in 2022, Russia enacted a naval blockade against Ukraine. The first few months saw fears of a potential global grain shortage as Ukraine exports it to impoverished nations such as Lebanon and Sudan.
The Black Sea Fleet played a major combat role in Southern Ukraine, particularly in the siege of Mariupol, by reinforcing amphibious assaults and naval bombardment that levelled the city. The deputy commander of the fleet, Captain 1st Rank Andrei Paliy, was killed in action fighting during the battle of Mariupol.
Nevertheless, Ukraine achieved a degree of success when Kyiv successfully sank Russia’s fleet flagship, the Moskva, which was named directly after the capital of Russia.
Accumulating Losses Against a Country with No Navy
Late 2022 and 2023 saw major Ukrainian strikes against not only Black Sea Fleet ships but also strategically important kilo-class submarine that were dry-docked. Last year, Ukraine stepped up assassinations against key naval officers, one of which targeted the captain of one of the fleet’s submarines, Stanislav Rzhitsky.
Arguably, Ukraine’s biggest attack against the Black Sea Fleet occurred on 22 September 2023, with Storm Shadow/Scalp missiles on the fleet’s headquarters in Sevastopol. Key commanders of Russia’s naval forces and Marines were killed and wounded, and the Kremlin took more drastic security measures in the aftermath of the attack.
Utilising homegrown sea drones, Kyiv would continue striking not only Russian naval assets in Crimea but also strategic assets that could help protect or earn fleet commanders, such as numerous S300/400 batteries and radar systems.
The strikes against the Black Sea Fleet successfully opened up Ukraine’s corridors for grain exports, which are a major lifeline to Kyiv’s economy under Russian military pressure. Compared to 2022, the Black Sea Fleet now is limited in providing naval support to Russian forces and spreads its ships far out from its area of operations.
Withdrawal Sows Cracks in Putin’s Strongman Aura
Under consistent Ukrainian seaborne drones and frequent attacks from surface-to-surface missiles, the Russian Ministry of Defence withdrew the last ships of the Black Sea Fleet from Crimea in mid-July 2024 to other naval bases such as Novorossiysk in Russia proper, the Sea of Azov near Mariupol, and occupied Abkhazia in Georgia.
Making Crimea untenable for the Russian military garrison is a key goal of Ukraine for preparations of future liberation, as stated by Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov. For such actions to happen, the degradation of Russia’s naval power is essential. Initially having 74 naval vessels in the Black Sea pre-2022, at least one-third of the fleet was either damaged or destroyed due to Ukrainian strikes.
Out of Russia’s main fleets, such as the Baltic, Arctic, Pacific, and Black Sea, the latter is the most prized and represents Russian imperial power. The fleet was the first line of a potential Russian-NATO war and the most invested out of Russia’s navy.
The status of the Black Sea Fleet and naval access in Crimea was a major pretext for the invasion and illegal annexation of the peninsula in 2014. The domino effect of the seizure and the ‘Novorossiya‘ ambitions factored into the Kremlin’s ultimate goal of landlocking Ukraine and initiating the full-scale war in 2022.
Russian armed forces have paid a heavy price for the war and the protection of the fleet, amassing 500,000 to upwards of 700,000 casualties, including major losses in specialised forces such as the VDV paratroopers, Spetsnaz, and naval infantry. Currently, Moscow is spending 1.5% of its state GDP on wartime payments for fallen troops in Ukraine.
The fleet’s withdrawal from Crimea could demoralise Russian flag officers and brigade commanders, who have reconstituted their units multiple times due to sheer losses since 2022.
Likewise, Ukraine, which destroyed a sizeable amount of the fleet with Neptune missiles and homegrown drones, won a major naval engagement without having a navy. The effects of Kyiv primarily destroying one-third of the navy mostly on their own will further degrade the myth of Russian invincibility.
ENJOYING THIS ARTICLE? HELP US TO PRODUCE MORE
Receive the monthly Byline Times newspaper and help to support fearless, independent journalism that breaks stories, shapes the agenda and holds power to account.
We’re not funded by a billionaire oligarch or an offshore hedge-fund. We rely on our readers to fund our journalism. If you like what we do, please subscribe.
The decimation of the Black Sea Fleet and the withdrawal of Russia’s naval vessels from Crimea is not only a strategic victory for Ukraine but symbolic and demoralising for Moscow.
Putin, who compares himself to Peter the Great, will ultimately have to justify military setbacks, loss of equipment, and casualties by a Russian leader on the offensive not seen since Tsar Nicholas II.