‘War in Ukraine: Lessons from Georgia’

Alexandra Hall Hall on how the West can better help Ukraine by learning from its mistakes with Georgia

One of the most revealing conversations I ever had as a diplomat was with the German Ambassador to Georgia, shortly after my arrival there as the British Ambassador. After exchanging a few pleasantries, I asked him what were his main objectives. “Promoting German culture and trade” he said, and then asked me the same question, to which I replied “promoting democracy, peace and security”. 

An awkward silence ensued, during which we both looked at each other nonplussed. A wider gulf in perceptions and priorities was hard to imagine between two countries that were ostensibly allies.

His response didn’t mean he didn’t care about democracy, peace, or security, or that I didn’t care about culture and trade. However, where I felt that the former were necessary preconditions for the latter to flourish, he felt that these were long term goals, that should not get in the way of Germany’s short-term interests.  

I went on to discover that he had previously been posted to Moscow, and that, like many diplomats who had been posted to Russia, he tended to view most regional issues through the prism of that experience. He was also strongly influenced by the history of Germany’s policy of Ostpolitik (engagement) with the Soviet Union, which most Germans credit with managing tensions during the Cold War and facilitating the peaceful reunification of East and West Germany. 

In particular, he had assimilated Russia’s view that Georgia fell within its ‘sphere of influence’, giving it legitimate concerns about Georgia’s trajectory, including its aspirations to join the EU and NATO. He worried that encouraging these hopes risked ‘provoking’ an angry Russian response, and would exacerbate, rather than ease, the security situation. He felt the safer course was to hold Georgia at bay – as had indeed been German policy for many years, including at the now notorious NATO summit of 2008 in Bucharest, when Germany and France effectively blocked US efforts to grant Georgia (and Ukraine) Membership Action Plans, which would have put them both on a formal path to NATO membership.

The German Ambassador also genuinely believed that former Georgian President Misha Saakashivili was to blame for the 2008 Russian war with Georgia, even though it was Russian troops which invaded Georgia, not the other way around. He was not alone in that view – many other analysts feel Saakashvili mishandled relations with Russia, needlessly goaded Putin, and over-estimated the degree to which the West would come to Georgia’s rescue. Nevertheless, the conflict was undeniably triggered by a build-up of Russian troops around Georgia in the months before the war, and Georgian sensitivities understandably heightened by Russia’s constant meddling in the breakaway territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

I could not have disagreed with my German colleague’s analysis more profoundly. I firmly believed that Georgia’s uncertain limbo between Russia and the West was precisely what encouraged Russian aggression, exacerbated instability, and impeded Georgia’s development. Russia’s belief that it had a right to dictate Georgia’s future was also what drove Georgia’s efforts to join the EU and NATO, not the other way round. Russia’s imperialist attitude was the problem, not Georgia’s efforts to protect itself. As an independent, sovereign country, Georgia was within its rights to seek EU and NATO membership, and if it was able to meet the criteria, we should not stand in its way. 

Towards that end, a major focus of the embassy’s work was funding programmes to support Georgia’s democratic development, including stronger institutions, more transparent and accountable government, an independent judiciary, and an active civil society. We felt this mattered not just to help Georgia towards the EU and NATO, but also because it would make Georgia more resilient against Russian pressure.

I regularly encouraged Georgian politicians to spend less time bickering with each other, and more time engaging with their constituents, and developing sound policies. I gave many speeches stressing UK support for Georgia’s territorial integrity, and its right to determine its own future, free from Russian interference. However, I was not shy about speaking out where I felt there were shortcomings in Georgia’s democracy and human rights record. 

This effort took on renewed importance after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2014, when the UK launched a new ‘Good Governance’ programme across the region, covering Georgia, Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus and Moldova. The UK beefed up its military cooperation with Georgia – offering training courses and the like – and expended significant capital to underscore its diplomatic support for Georgia through repeated ministerial visits, sponsoring of resolutions at the UN, and the establishment of a formal annual bilateral government-to-government dialogue.

 The US, the Nordics, and above all, the Baltic and Eastern European embassies, who had direct experience of Soviet rule, had similar priorities and approaches.  

The German and most other EU embassies, with the French somewhere in-between, were far less visible or vocal on these political matters. I sometimes suspected that they even quite welcomed setbacks in Georgia’s democratic development, because it made it easier to argue that Georgia was not ready for EU or NATO membership.  They also applied a Catch 22 argument to Georgia’s situation, that as long as part of its territory was occupied, it could not join NATO; overlooking the fact that this only increased the incentive for Russia to maintain its grip on Georgia, making Georgian progress well-nigh impossible. 

While Germany and France were the most openly reluctant to admit Georgia (or Ukraine) into NATO, it’s fair to say that their position had the benefit of sparing all of us from having to make hard decisions. The Obama administration was much less enthusiastic about the project than the Bush Administration, and had even sought a ‘reset’ of relations with Russia, before its 2014 invasion of Ukraine. The UK’s priority was to preserve NATO unity. Georgia’s state of limbo allowed us to pay lip service to NATO’s ‘Open Door’ policy, and give Georgia just enough aid to say we were doing our bit to support it, without ever having to bite the bullet of letting it in. 

However, one unfortunate consequence of this Western hesitancy was that it fed Geor