Repression Without Borders: How Putin Targets Russian Opposition Figures Abroad

Since the beginning of the full-scale war in Ukraine in 2022, domestic repression in Russia has reached unprecedented levels.

However, few realise that behind these internal crackdowns lies another front — transnational persecution targeting exiled opposition figures, journalists, human rights defenders, and activists.

This new form of pressure — hybrid, multilayered, and psychologically exhausting — has become one of the Kremlin’s key instruments in combating political dissent beyond its own borders.

Over the past two years, dozens, if not hundreds, of activists have faced attempts at physical, legal, digital, and moral intimidation far outside Russian territory. A term has emerged — “repression without borders” — to describe this unique phenomenon of the Putin era: the export of the state’s repressive machinery into the global sphere.

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The Concept of the ‘External Enemy’ as the Foundation of New Policy

The Russian political system, as the successor of the Soviet model, has historically relied on the image of an enemy. In the early 2000s, these were Chechen terrorists; later, Ukrainian “nationalists” and so-called “internal enemies” — members of civil society and independent media.

As Putin has repeatedly said, they “constantly rock the boat.” But with the wave of mass emigration after 2022, a fundamental shift occurred: the threat became “exportable,” and these so-called “enemies” — geographically elusive.

“They left — but continue to harm the country.” This formula is now actively promoted by Russian state propaganda. It is a constructed narrative aimed at demonising those who fled Russia: opposition politicians, journalists, human rights defenders, and even ordinary critics of the regime.

The narrative gained particular traction after the invasion of Ukraine, when tens of thousands of Russians left the country for political reasons. This framing lays the groundwork for the moral and political justification of using state resources to persecute its own citizens — even when they are now under the legal protection of other jurisdictions.

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Key Instruments of Transnational Repression

Legal Tools and Interpol

The Russian authorities continue to actively exploit international legal mechanisms — particularly Interpol — despite official claims of their political neutrality.

Well before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, it was already evident that Russia had been abusing Interpol’s ‘Red Notice’ system to pursue political opponents and restrict freedom of expression. Red Notices, arrest warrants, and extradition requests have increasingly become tools of pressure and control.

Examples:

• Artur Zaripov, an activist from Bashkortostan, was detained in Poland at Russia’s request through Interpol. He was later released after it became clear that the charges against him were politically motivated and lacked legal substance.
• Bill Browder, a well-known critic of the Kremlin and advocate for the Magnitsky Act, has been subject to repeated attempts by Russia to detain him through Interpol. On several occasions, he was briefly detained in various countries until the Secretary General of Interpol in Lyon intervened, confirming that “no Red Notice exists, nor has ever existed” against him.
• Bi-2, a prominent Russian rock band that has openly criticised the war in Ukraine, faced a politically charged incident in January 2024. Band members were detained in Thailand after a concert, officially due to visa violations. However, the situation quickly took a political turn. Russian diplomats reportedly pushed for their deportation to Russia — raising serious concerns among human rights defenders and the media. The musicians warned of direct political pressure from Moscow and the risk of persecution. Thanks to the intervention of Israeli authorities (several band members hold Israeli citizenship), they were not extradited and safely traveled to Israel.
  
  The incident highlighted how Russian authorities exert cross-border pressure even on artists and how international support can mitigate such risks.

In 2023 alone, Russia reportedly filed over 100 international arrest requests targeting activists involved in anti-war movements and human rights advocacy.

Legal experts specialising in political asylum cases note that this form of “legal attack” is becoming systematic and protracted. Even when these requests do not result in actual arrests, they create a persistent climate of instability. Being placed on Russia’s federal wanted list can hinder international travel, expose personal data, and — in countries that maintain friendly relations with Moscow — potentially lead to detention.

Despite Interpol’s public commitment to political neutrality and its current policy of not automatically processing Russian ‘Red Notice’ requests, the Kremlin continues to use this mechanism as a means of transnational repression.

All Russian requests must now undergo manual review at Interpol’s headquarters in Lyon. Nevertheless, Russia remains intent on leveraging this tool — although now under increasing international scrutiny.

This reflects a broader strategy: applying external pressure through every available channel. While the tighter oversight marks a step toward limiting Russia’s ability to abuse global legal instruments, the battle is far from over.

Since the start of the war, the Kremlin has dramatically intensified its use of criminal prosecution mechanisms. Thousands of individuals — including activists, independent journalists, human rights defenders, and anti-war participants — have been placed on Russia’s federal wanted list. Many face politically motivated charges or are under investigation.

Being listed means that returning to Russia is not a safe option — it would almost certainly lead to immediate arrest, and due to Moscow’s continued use of international legal requests, including Interpol mechanisms, the risk of arrest in third countries remains high. For many, this creates a permanent state of uncertainty, where mobility is a threat and safety is precarious.

Transnational repression is not only a legal and diplomatic challenge — it is a psychological and existential one, pushing dissenters into a prolonged exile with no clear resolution in sight.

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Prosecution and Convictions In Absentia

Hundreds of Russian emigrants have already become the subjects of criminal cases initiated in absentia by Russian authorities. The charges vary widely — from “spreading false information about the Russian army” to “participation in an extremist organisation,” high treason, or terrorism.

Particular focus is given to those who:

• Made public statements against the war
• Donated to banned foundations or charities
• Worked with or supported “undesirable” NGOs or independent media

These politically motivated cases can serve as grounds for extradition requests. Individuals charged or convicted under such cases must now navigate international travel with extreme caution — especially in countries whose legal systems fall short of European human rights standards.

Additionally, these prosecutions have been used as a pretext for pressure on relatives remaining in Russia. There have been numerous documented cases of home searches, interrogations, and other forms of intimidation directed at family members — part of a broader strategy of guilt by association and legal harassment.

Moreover, inclusion in criminal proceedings often leads to serious practical restrictions. These include refusal to renew Russian passports abroad, denial of access to consular services, or even outright refusal to issue any identity documents. As a result, many Russians in exile face mounting bureaucratic and legal obstacles, further isolating them and complicating their lives in host countries.

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The ‘Pause of War’: Why the FSB Appears Cautious — For Now

Despite the breadth and persistence of these tools, there has been a noticeable decline in the external activity of Russian security services abroad in 2024–2025.

This lull is not the result of any strategic shift or political restraint — rather, it reflects temporary operational constraints within Russia’s security apparatus.

In private conversations, many analysts from think tanks and civil society groups have identified the same pattern: Russia’s intelligence and enforcement agencies are undergoing a strategic reallocation of resources to prioritise domestic stability amid ongoing war. At the same time, tightening sanctions and increasing scrutiny of Russia’s international actions have created operational barriers for covert activities abroad.

This has triggered an internal recalibration of priorities — with a growing emphasis on managing political dissent within Russia’s borders and supporting the war effort directly. However, this is widely understood to be a temporary condition — a strategic pause, rather than de-escalation.

Once the military phase of the conflict ends — regardless of its outcome — the external operations of Russia’s security services are likely to resume with greater force and reach than ever before.

We should expect:

• Renewed attempts at physical elimination of perceived enemies (as seen in the cases of Alexander Litvinenko and Sergei Skripal)
• Expanded cyberattacks on Western institutions and Russian diaspora infrastructure abroad
• Escalating disinformation campaigns and direct pressure on European media
• Increased efforts to corrupt or co-opt Western political figures
• Intensified surveillance and threats targeting exiled opposition figures

This prospective shift marks a future phase of transnational repression — more aggressive, global, and technologically enabled. It will target not only individuals, but also the fragile ecosystems of Russian civil society in exile.

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How to Protect Yourself: Strategies Against Transnational Repression

In the face of transnational political persecution, developing a multi-layered strategy of defence is critical. Exiled activists, journalists, and human rights defenders must adopt both legal and practical tools to safeguard themselves in the increasingly hostile international environment shaped by Russian influence.

1) Legal Preparedness

Understanding your legal rights is a fundamental first step. This includes:

• Seeking timely consultations with human rights organisations and legal aid NGOs
• Assembling and regularly updating documentation related to potential persecution
• Monitoring arrest warrants and Interpol Red Notices through legal networks and official channels.

Legal literacy is not a luxury — it is a shield. It allows individuals to anticipate legal risks in the countries they reside in or travel through and to respond quickly when threats arise.

2) Digital Security

Digital hygiene is now a matter of physical safety. Measures should include:

• The use of encrypted communication tools and reliable VPNs
• Mandatory two-factor authentication on all accounts
• Basic training for team members in cybersecurity and best practices

A single digital vulnerability can expose entire networks. Digital security must become an integral part of daily routines for anyone at risk.

3) Public Visibility as Protection

Paradoxically, public attention can serve as one of the most effective forms of protection.

• Sharing your story through independent media outlets
• Engaging with journalists, researchers, and human rights monitors
• Building a public narrative that reinforces your legitimacy and credibility

While publicity may increase visibility to hostile actors, it often serves as a deterrent by raising the political cost of repression.

4) Local Partnerships

Collaboration with local NGOs, ombudspersons, and legal defenders is essential.

• Local actors understand their country’s institutions and legal systems
• They can advocate on your behalf and influence political decisions
• They often serve as crucial intermediaries in cases of detentions, extradition requests, or legal disputes

Solidarity at the local level builds resilience and mobilises institutional responses to foreign repression.

5) Transnational Solidarity Networks

Exiled communities must not act in isolation. Forming international coalitions can:

• Provide emotional and logistical support
• Help share best practices in legal defence, media advocacy, and security
• Develop collective strategies for resisting pressure across borders.

United, diasporas gain greater legitimacy and leverage in international arenas. Shared strategies increase efficiency and reduce vulnerability.

6) Monitoring Escalation

It is important to remain aware that Russian security services may soon intensify their operations abroad. While current activity may seem restrained, experts believe this is a strategic pause rather than a sign of retreat.

Exiled communities must not act in isolation. Forming international coalitions can:

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Repression Without Borders: A New Authoritarian Paradigm

Transnational repression is no longer an exception — it is a central feature of Russia’s evolving authoritarian model. In this model, dissent is not only suppressed within the country’s borders but actively pursued beyond them.

Those who left Russia are no longer passive observers. They are seen by the regime as carriers of inconvenient truth — voices the Kremlin seeks to silence at all costs.

To survive, diaspora communities must learn how to protect themselves and to succeed, they must organise.

Only through systemic, coordinated, and international cooperation can this export of repression be countered. It is already part of a broader global assault on democratic values and institutions.

Russia today poses a threat not only to Ukraine or Central and Eastern Europe — but also to its own people, wherever they may live.

This fight continues — inside Russia and outside it, in courtrooms, in media, online, in our words and actions.

And victory begins with recognising the scale of the threat — and the willingness to confront it.