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“In a quiet suburb, a loving couple runs an art agency, raises kids, and kills for the FSB,” says a Ukrainian officer, in a balaclava, as he talks at a secret location near the frontline, with drones whizzing above and artillery shells whistling by.
He pulls up a quote on his phone: “The Russian world is everywhere there is Russian influence, in one form or another: cultural, informational, military, economic, ideological or humanitarian… The extent of our influence varies greatly from region to region, but it is never zero. So we will spread out in all directions, as far as God wills and as strong as we are.”
“The former aide to Putin, Vladislav Surkov, said this, and he’s not joking,” says another officer. “We are here to give an urgent warning to the free world.”
Byline Times presents an exclusive interview with Ukrainian “Elves” unit officers, revealing how Russia infiltrates democratic societies and why—and how—the West must fight back. “Elves” is a nod to Tolkien’s warriors in an existential war of light against darkness, where the stakes are nothing less than the fate of the free world.
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How it Worked
Infiltration is a long-standing tactic: like all spies in human history, Kremlin operatives create a cover identity to embed agents within foreign countries or high-value targets. The Elves have been countering Kremlin infiltration campaigns for decades.
Russian agents infiltrated Ukraine—and the Kherson region—in two stages.
In 2001, a wave of immigrants from Russia entered Ukraine, claiming to be fleeing criminal threats. Wealthy businessmen set up companies, bought properties, flaunted expensive lifestyles, and then switched to politics. This was a classic infiltration strategy—gaining economic and political influence under false pretences.
More agents were cultivated locally. The key collaborator in the Kherson region, Volodymyr Saldo, exemplifies a long-term “sleeper agent” placed by Russian intelligence. He rose through Kherson’s construction sector during the USSR era, switched to politics in 2001, served as mayor of Kherson three times in 2002—2012, and later as a member of parliament with the pro-Russian Party of Regions. When the Russians captured Kherson in 2022, they appointed Saldo the head of the Kherson administration and “Governor” installed by Russian occupational forces.
The now-deceased deputy to Volodymyr Saldo, Kirill Stremousov, a public figure and provocateur turned journalist-collaborator, presents an example of the second wave of agent recruitment, which came in 2010—2012, ahead of Crimea’s annexation. Russia’s oil wealth funded large-scale influence operations. The Kremlin agents gathered intelligence and identified key figures to recruit and bribe. After the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea, when the Ukrainian Government established Anti-Terrorist Centres (ATC) to fight the Kremlin invasion, Russian intelligence managed to recruit several heads of ATCs and the Ukrainian secret services (SBU). Stermousov was then under the protection of one such double agent, Ihor Sadohin, head of an ATC and a senior SBU officer. After the 2022 full-scale invasion, Stremousov openly worked for the occupying forces until his suspicious death on 9 November 2022. Sadohin was arrested in Ukraine on suspicion of treason in 2022.
Good “legending” allows Russian agents to gather intelligence and establish networks without scrutiny. The Elves are still investigating a Kyiv-registered “security company”, which started to operate in Kherson eighteen months before the full-scale invasion. It carried out reconnaissance activities, moving vehicles and personnel under the guise of a legitimate business .
Similar infiltration tactics are being used across the West.
Weaponisation of Refugees
Refugees, due to their vulnerable circumstances, are often susceptible to manipulation through religious and ideological influences and become a tool for the host country’s destabilisation. While not all immigrants present a risk, underestimating this Russian tactic is a mistake.
The Kremlin exploits all refugees as a pressure tool against western societies, as the influx strains state budgets, diverting funds from defence. Yet, Russian-speaking diaspora communities in the EU, UK, and the US pose a special threat.
Fake Opposition
FSB agents infiltrate the post-Soviet diaspora by posing as political opposition activists. After staging provocations in Russia to draw “persecution”, the agents flee, and once embedded, form networks within diaspora communities, gathering intelligence and building credibility. Activated sleeper agents expand these networks, recruiting opposition members. Some recruits are aware of their mission, others are unknowingly manipulated into destabilising actions. A good example is Pablo González, a Spanish journalist with Russian roots, who attempted to infiltrate the Russian opposition in Europe in 2016. He was arrested in Poland in 2022 on charges of espionage and later transferred to Moscow as part of a prisoner exchange between Russia and the west.
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