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“In a quiet suburb, a loving couple runs an art agency, raises kids, and kills for the FSB,” says a Ukrainian officer, in a balaclava, as he talks at a secret location near the frontline, with drones whizzing above and artillery shells whistling by.
He pulls up a quote on his phone: “The Russian world is everywhere there is Russian influence, in one form or another: cultural, informational, military, economic, ideological or humanitarian… The extent of our influence varies greatly from region to region, but it is never zero. So we will spread out in all directions, as far as God wills and as strong as we are.”
“The former aide to Putin, Vladislav Surkov, said this, and he’s not joking,” says another officer. “We are here to give an urgent warning to the free world.”
Byline Times presents an exclusive interview with Ukrainian “Elves” unit officers, revealing how Russia infiltrates democratic societies and why—and how—the West must fight back. “Elves” is a nod to Tolkien’s warriors in an existential war of light against darkness, where the stakes are nothing less than the fate of the free world.
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How it Worked
Infiltration is a long-standing tactic: like all spies in human history, Kremlin operatives create a cover identity to embed agents within foreign countries or high-value targets. The Elves have been countering Kremlin infiltration campaigns for decades.
Russian agents infiltrated Ukraine—and the Kherson region—in two stages.
In 2001, a wave of immigrants from Russia entered Ukraine, claiming to be fleeing criminal threats. Wealthy businessmen set up companies, bought properties, flaunted expensive lifestyles, and then switched to politics. This was a classic infiltration strategy—gaining economic and political influence under false pretences.
More agents were cultivated locally. The key collaborator in the Kherson region, Volodymyr Saldo, exemplifies a long-term “sleeper agent” placed by Russian intelligence. He rose through Kherson’s construction sector during the USSR era, switched to politics in 2001, served as mayor of Kherson three times in 2002—2012, and later as a member of parliament with the pro-Russian Party of Regions. When the Russians captured Kherson in 2022, they appointed Saldo the head of the Kherson administration and “Governor” installed by Russian occupational forces.
The now-deceased deputy to Volodymyr Saldo, Kirill Stremousov, a public figure and provocateur turned journalist-collaborator, presents an example of the second wave of agent recruitment, which came in 2010—2012, ahead of Crimea’s annexation. Russia’s oil wealth funded large-scale influence operations. The Kremlin agents gathered intelligence and identified key figures to recruit and bribe. After the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea, when the Ukrainian Government established Anti-Terrorist Centres (ATC) to fight the Kremlin invasion, Russian intelligence managed to recruit several heads of ATCs and the Ukrainian secret services (SBU). Stermousov was then under the protection of one such double agent, Ihor Sadohin, head of an ATC and a senior SBU officer. After the 2022 full-scale invasion, Stremousov openly worked for the occupying forces until his suspicious death on 9 November 2022. Sadohin was arrested in Ukraine on suspicion of treason in 2022.
Good “legending” allows Russian agents to gather intelligence and establish networks without scrutiny. The Elves are still investigating a Kyiv-registered “security company”, which started to operate in Kherson eighteen months before the full-scale invasion. It carried out reconnaissance activities, moving vehicles and personnel under the guise of a legitimate business .
Similar infiltration tactics are being used across the West.
Weaponisation of Refugees
Refugees, due to their vulnerable circumstances, are often susceptible to manipulation through religious and ideological influences and become a tool for the host country’s destabilisation. While not all immigrants present a risk, underestimating this Russian tactic is a mistake.
The Kremlin exploits all refugees as a pressure tool against western societies, as the influx strains state budgets, diverting funds from defence. Yet, Russian-speaking diaspora communities in the EU, UK, and the US pose a special threat.
Fake Opposition
FSB agents infiltrate the post-Soviet diaspora by posing as political opposition activists. After staging provocations in Russia to draw “persecution”, the agents flee, and once embedded, form networks within diaspora communities, gathering intelligence and building credibility. Activated sleeper agents expand these networks, recruiting opposition members. Some recruits are aware of their mission, others are unknowingly manipulated into destabilising actions. A good example is Pablo González, a Spanish journalist with Russian roots, who attempted to infiltrate the Russian opposition in Europe in 2016. He was arrested in Poland in 2022 on charges of espionage and later transferred to Moscow as part of a prisoner exchange between Russia and the west.
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Crime and Business
One of the FSB’s favourite tactics is embedding criminals and “businessmen” into western countries. Entrepreneurs are allowed to profit within Russia; later, a minor persecution is staged, so the businessmen can claim dissatisfaction and relocate abroad. Their independent business success legends serve as a façade, while illicit funds and money laundering are used to support their activities. A group of criminals and individuals posing as businessmen were exchanged in a prisoner swap in 2024.
It is important to understand that in Russia, the line between legitimate business and organised crime has blurred since the 1990s. Both criminals and entrepreneurs operate under the protection of the mafia state, which serves as krysha—a term meaning “roof” used to describe the Kremlin’s role as the ultimate protector and patron, much like a mafia boss. Over time, they begin to undermine the host country, carrying out actions that harm its interests and supporting Russian-founded public organisations.
Communities of Compatriots
Russian-founded public organisations are another tool. The Russian Unity, established before the annexation of Crimea in 2014, was an organisation advocating for the integration of the Ukrainian Donetsk and Luhansk regions into Russia. They leveraged the support of local Cossack communities and propagated a misleading narrative that the Donbas region was the economic backbone of Ukraine.
In reality, this area had been heavily subsidised for years, with state-owned mines operating at a loss. For instance, in 2013, the production cost of coal in Donbas state mines was approximately 1,350 hryvnia per ton, while the state-subsidised price was 480 hryvnia per ton, with the deficit covered by state subsidies. Russian propaganda exploited this disparity, convincing locals that their labour sustained the entire nation and that Ukraine’s survival depended on their contributions. Similar narratives are used to undermine miners’ communities in the US.
According to the Elves, Kremlin propagandists use the Imperial Palestine Society, founded in Tsarist Russia, in Russia-occupied territories in Ukraine, as well as in Europe and Palestine. Since 2007, a former director of the Russian security services FSB Sergei Stepashin served as the Chairman of the Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society. In 2022, a Greek national Simos Panagiotidis, one of the leaders of the Imperial Palestine Society, tied to the FSB, served as a curator for the occupied Kherson region.
Analysing Russian-held marches and gatherings in the west reveals that key organisers are connected with Russian intelligence. One such tool is the Immortal Regiment, a global pro-Russian event in which participants carry portraits of relatives who fought in World War II. Used to promote Russian nationalist narratives and justify current military actions, it is staged worldwide to maintain influence and spread Kremlin narratives.
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The Church and Religious Communities
The Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) is not merely a religious institution—it functions as a strategic arm of the state, reinforcing Kremlin ideology and spreading false narratives. It serves as a branch of the FSB, operating both as an intelligence tool and as an instrument of social control.
The church conditions believers into submission, preaching hierarchical obedience—women must obey men, men must obey priests, and priests claim divine authority that cannot be questioned. This doctrine fosters a society of subservience, aligning with broader Kremlin strategies of control.
Another core narrative propagated by the ROC is Russian supremacy. The Church positions Moscow as the spiritual and cultural centre, asserting its dominance over other nations’ Orthodox communities. In the Balkan conflicts, particularly in Serbia, the ROC encouraged the idea that Serbs were the sole state-forming nation of the former Yugoslavia. A similar strategy was deployed in Georgia and Ukraine to deepen divisions and justify Russian interference.
Beyond ideological influence, the ROC provides operational cover. Key figures within the ROC act as agents of influence. Through their ranks in the Moscow Patriarchate, they exert control over parishioners, manipulating them through two primary methods: using the uninformed “in the dark” and rallying ideological supporters “in the light”.
Monasteries serve as intelligence residencies, offering a haven for espionage and subversive activities. Many monasteries accept novices and pilgrims without vetting them, making them ideal sites for covert operations. In the US, there have been reports of military-style Russian Orthodox camps.
An American, Daniel Martindale, used his cover as a devout Christian engaged in charity work in Poland and Ukraine to spy for Russia, exploiting religious trust to gather intelligence. A United24 Media report investigates how the ROC functions as a global espionage and propaganda tool for the Kremlin across Ukraine and Europe. A 2024 report by OSINT agency Molfar suggests that the ROC may be utilizing its European churches for espionage in Sweden, Norway, Finland, the Netherlands, and the Czech Republic.
Artists and Diplomats
Art, in its purest form, is inconvenient for intelligence operations as artists attract too much attention, yet an artist’s agent could, and did, turn out to be a Kremlin secret agent.
Art serves as a powerful propaganda tool. Under Kremlin influence, cultural institutions, exhibitions, and film projects are often co-opted to shape narratives, distort history, and subtly reinforce Russian ideological positions.
Russian political strategists weaponise nostalgia, targeting the diaspora through Soviet-era films on YouTube. These films are aimed at those who grew up before the Soviet collapse, subtly rebuilding emotional ties to the past. Unlike modern Russian films, which cater to domestic audiences, these classics resonate with those who have lived abroad long enough to detach from Russian state media but still hold sentimental connections.
Diplomats and military attachés frequently operate as agents of influence, using their official status to cultivate relationships, spread disinformation, and recruit assets. This is a well-documented tactic, with Russian embassies serving as hubs for intelligence gathering and covert operations under diplomatic cover.
The Downed Riders
The FSB invests in failed political parties, revives them with fresh funding, and sets up media outlets to amplify marginalised voices. Such groups and individuals are a good target for “cultivation”. A politician who once held power but was cast aside is a prime target for the Kremlin’s recruitment. In 2023, the pro-Kremlin media outlet Voice of Europe was used to funnel up to €1 million a month to far-right politicians across Europe to spread Kremlin propaganda and boost pro-Russian candidates ahead of EU elections.
The ‘Experts‘
Hired influencers pose as journalists, publishing articles to manipulate public opinion, carving the texts to fit into the chosen demographics. They often argue that sanctions against Russia will lead to inflation, higher costs, and economic hardship. The goal is simple: turn public frustration into pressure on governments to lift sanctions on Russia and abandon Ukraine. These tactics weaponise economic concerns, making people believe that supporting Ukraine means fewer products in their fridge, more expensive fuel, and shorter vacations, creating a powerful lever to shift public sentiment.
On 5 June 2022, the security service of Ukraine (SBU) gained access to the tutorials of the 5th Department of the Russian Federation’s intelligence agencies (FSB), on the “proper coverage of the special operation” in Ukraine. The documents state “a need to strengthen the work of journalists and media experts from foreign countries (not only in Western countries, but also in the Arab world, in Central Asia, China, India, etc.) in addition to strengthening propaganda in Russia … With regard to the EU, start a massive information dump of the facts and forecasts of the deterioration in the lives of people in the EU caused by the policy of the EU governments, supporting nationalist groups in Ukraine. Provoke internal public pressure on the Government and political elites in western countries.”
In 2024, the US Department of Justice alleged that Tenet Media, a Tennessee-based network producing content for right-wing influencers, was funded by Russia’s state-backed news network RT to disseminate Kremlin-approved disinformation via social media.
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Tactics of Demoralisation and Destabilisation
Russian intelligence conducts deep analysis of social processes, identifying vulnerabilities within a society. They pinpoint societal fractures—ethnic, religious, economic, or ideological—and apply pressure where it will have the greatest destabilising effect. Once a weak point is identified, they introduce polarising narratives and fuel discord, ensuring that tensions escalate from internal dissatisfaction to systemic crisis. The Elves mentioned a few examples from the Kremlin textbook.
Deflection, Tension Points, and Weaponising Fear
In the Middle Ages, actors and puppet theaters worked in the market, while pickpockets robbed spectators. Today, the same principle applies—while diversionary terrorist acts are carried out by easily controlled individuals, more strategic moves take place in the background: destabilisation efforts, political corruption, and intelligence operations. The goal is to stage a terrorist attack using proxies, forcing the target state to expend resources while shaping the image of an enemy and further destabilising society. The chaos serves as a deflection, allowing other operations to proceed unnoticed.
An example of deflection and using refugees’ narrative is the engineered farmers’ protests on the Poland-Ukraine border. Russian political strategists fuel discontent by spreading claims that Ukrainian refugees drain Poland’s budget, reducing social benefits for Poles. The message is clear: fewer refugees mean a better economy.
In reality, removing Ukrainian refugees would damage Poland’s economy, as skilled Polish workers have long emigrated to Belgium, Germany, and the UK, leaving gaps that Ukrainians have filled. The narrative is a distraction, shifting public frustration away from real economic challenges and toward an external scapegoat.
Attempted assassinations of influential figures in the West are a classic mafia state tactic to spread fear and send messages that no one is beyond the reach.
Virtual Spheres of Influence
Kremlin strategists extend their influence beyond the physical world into the information space, waging psychological warfare. From TikTok to X, Facebook to Instagram, bot networks flood social platforms, shaping narratives and amplifying disinformation.
Russian networks flood social media with bots. To create a convincing bot “with history”, Russian operatives rent or buy established social media accounts. These accounts, which may have posted about fishing or travel for years, suddenly pivot to spreading pro-Kremlin narratives.
Platforms such as Viber and Telegram, widely used in the post-Soviet space, offer to rent or sell accounts, making it easier for Russian disinformation to blend into real conversations
Hybrid war inevitably escalates into an active, hot phase, but the real battle is for collective consciousness and public opinion, say the Elves officers who face combat situations and fire daily. Therefore, moral and psychological preparation of the population is critical.
Mentality Differences
If the “Russian world” advances, the level of violence will be incomparable, warn the Elves.
“The enemy will be well-equipped, with the same forces and capabilities as your army, but with a completely different mindset,” says one officer. “This will not be WWI nor WWII. Projecting European values and sensibilities on the mafia state will lead to defeat.”
“When Russian troops entered villages in the Kyiv region and saw Ukrainian houses with double-glazed windows, paved streets, gas, showers, and toilets, they were outraged,” notes the other. “‘Who allowed you to live like this?’ Imagine the questions—and the rage—the ‘Russian world’ will have for Europe.”
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‘Dead-end‘
Russia is a “deal-dead entity,” explain the Elves. “Incapable of honouring an agreement and with no intent to honour any pact it signs.” The old metaphor of playing chess with a crocodile is fitting: rules or skills do not matter, as the crocodile will devour the chess pieces, the board, and the player. In other less evocative words, all agreements with the Kremlin are meaningless as their society is ruled by lawlessness, not law.
Modern Russia is a fusion of the KGB and the criminal world and is not accountable for its words or fulfilling its commitments. In a lawless modern Russian society, individuals and groups take advantage of opportunities. The Kremlin controls crucial resources, such as oil and gas, and manipulates situations to its benefit.
“Imagine a thug terrorising a passerby for a cigarette,” explains the Elves officer. “You don’t give them a cigarette as they’d then take your wallet and your clothes. You confront them from a position of force. Then, they’ll back up and claim they only wanted the cigarette. The approach to Russia should be no different than dealing with a thug in an alley. Criminals and the FSB understand only the language of force.
“If you are weak or present weakness, the Kremlin will jump on the opportunity and exploit it. They have tried this in Moldova, Georgia, and now attempt it in Ukraine, but they are failing here. Yet, across the globe, Russian sleeper agents lurk, hidden in plain sight, and the hybrid war erodes the world from within.”
Russia’s infiltration and subversive tactics aim to destabilise nations through covert operations, information warfare, and societal division. Ukraine, on the frontline of these hybrid attacks, offers vital lessons for the West in recognising and countering such threats. By studying Ukraine’s resistance and the experience of the intelligence units such as the Elves, the West can prepare to confront Russian destabilisation efforts.