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When the UK Government merged the Department for International Development (DFID) into the UK Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development Office (FCDO) in 2020, then-Prime Minister Boris Johnson justified it as a response to a perceived decline in public support for development aid and as a reform to align Britain’s development policy with its existing foreign and defence priorities.
While the merger was arguably successful in these two narrow ways, many development professionals have since argued that the merger cost the UK its status as a “development superpower.”
According to former DFID Minister Rory Stewart, “the decision to amalgamate… has meant that more people with less development expertise are involved in decision-making, that there is less radical innovation, that relationships are eroded, that the overall development budget, particularly bilaterally, is often not available.”
This entirely avoidable outcome of self-sabotage arose out of an exaggerated rivalry between UK foreign policy objectives and development goals.
In fact, Britain’s ability to execute upon a consistent and ambitious development strategy would be a logical way to improve Britain’s relations with less-developed states amid post-Brexit realities and today’s unstable security environment. Especially now that Keir Starmer pursues a “progressive realist” foreign policy and the second Donald Trump administration has already halted US development efforts, an opportunity is emerging for Britain to reclaim its development superpower status in this ensuing leadership vacuum. The Starmer ministry would be best positioned to achieve this through a restored DFID.
As Europe faces its worst security crisis since 1945 and security in other regions of the world continues to deteriorate, Britain cannot afford to stand idly by if the United States cuts back on its existing development plans.
The US will likely abdicate its de facto leadership of the G7’s Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII), which was established to rival China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
Similarly, US efforts towards Ukraine and Palestine’s post-war reconstruction, the strengthening of global climate resilience, and the promotion of anti-corruption reforms and enforcement abroad will likely be scaled back as well.
The expected absence of US support for these policies will eventually have negative knock-on impacts for Britain, and accordingly, the Starmer Government must pre-emptively tackle such voids.
Granted, like the rest of the world, the cost-of-living crisis has already placed a heavy burden upon the UK public. Any attempt by the Starmer to return to the Labour Party’s original commitment of reestablishing DFID would thus be difficult, and the Government has already slashed its development budget in recognition of this reality. Still, such measures must be a temporary stopgap, as any further concessions on development policy could pose new risks.
Some in the Labour party itself, including incumbent UK Foreign Secretary David Lammy, may argue that the FCDO is better suited for this task given how its very structure links development and foreign policies.
Indeed, DFID had historically clashed with the Foreign Office to the point where even a number in DFID initially welcomed the merger as a means of easing inter-departmental tensions. However, many of these same former DFID staff later derided the amalgamation as a “hostile takeover” within mere months due to how Foreign Office staff gained leadership over UK development policy.
What made DFID so comparatively effective to both the FCDO and its international development aid counterparts was its focus, autonomy, and institutional expertise on formulating and executing international development policy.
According to Stewart, “It [created] a cadre of genuine focused expertise, long-standing relationships with the key international institutions and governments. The combination of a protected budget and independence also allowed it to be extremely radical and innovative in terms of pursuing new evidence and new programming.” Yet, without DFID, the UK has since lost many of these advantages.
Even from a solely realpolitik perspective, the decline of such capabilities has already had a direct negative impact on Britain’s security as conditions in global risk zones continue to decline.
Ukraine and Gaza are especially visible in these circumstances, with the costs of reconstruction estimated by the World Bank to be $486 billion for Ukraine and over $80 billion by the RAND Corporation for Gaza in early 2024.