Paul Dempsey shows how ‘big data’ cannot replace ‘no data’ and that the UK’s centralised plan to combat the Coronavirus was flawed at the outset
On Monday, in the House of Lords, Lord Bethell revealed at the cost of the Government’s COVID-19 contact tracing app has reached a staggering £11.8m, and it is still unworkable.
The Government has already been criticised for failing to take a system-level approach to the complexities of the Coronavirus outbreak. Though its current approach to track-and-trace is system-based, the problem is that it is the wrong system for the UK’s immediate needs.
NHSX, the healthcare technology arm, has been directed to take an inappropriate and overly complex technology-led approach. As Jason Bay, product lead on the TraceTogether Covid-19 app in Singapore points out in his April Medium post, apps and other digital tools make an incremental contribution towards effective contact tracing. They leverage what you already have. They are not – and must not be – at its core.
“There are critical factors that a purely automated system will not have access to. You cannot ‘big data’ your way out of a ‘no data’ situation. Period. Any attempt to believe otherwise is an exercise in hubris and technology triumphalism. There are lives at stake. False positives and false negatives have real-life (and death) consequences. We use TraceTogether to supplement contact tracing – not replace it.”
Yet that is what appears to have happened in the UK
Tha Apps’ Role in Track and Trace
The UK system is a three-legged stool. There is the app. There is a mostly centralised network of 25,000 contact tracers, under the aegis of Baroness Dido Harding and administered by contactor Serco. These feed data in a common format into an AI-based hub. This is enabled by data cleaning and warehousing, and analytics from two other contractors, respectively Palantir and Faculty.
The problem with this architecture is that it imposes an architectural and engineering rigidity upon a system that has already been described as “not fit for purpose” in a lengthy report by the Independent SAGE group of scientists and public health experts.
The effective failure of the NHSX app project illustrates how technology is becoming more of a hindrance than a benefit because of how its objectives have been defined.
There have been claims that NHSX has treated at least one other UK app project as an “enemy” rather than a potential collaborator and developers elsewhere in the world confirm that they have had much less contact with or from our shores compared with other countries.
NHSX insiders dispute this, but do say that the nature of the UK approach has rendered much of the research elsewhere hard, if not impossible, to reuse. They add that the terms of commercial confidentiality with contractors across the UK system has prevented them from consulting outside the project’s members. At a time when pretty much every other app team has sought to open-source its work — Taiwan even developed many of its tools with the help of public hackathons — this is bizarre, to say the least.
Moreover, while health secretary Matt Hancock now says that the app can be fixed by moving from an entirely bespoke (and, it would appear, proprietary) strategy to one that leverages the best of the open platform offered by Apple and Google, this may be hard to do.
Apple contradicted the minister’s claim that active collaboration had already begun and the main elements the UK wishes to change are thought to be at odds with the company’s stance on privacy — one that has already seen it ready to stand firm against the FBI.
The app, then, is still an issue. Even if that can be overcome, the real challenge is the architecture.
The Architecture
Its degree of centralisation is driven by the needs of an AI (clean inputs from a manageable network from which insights are derived at the macro level) rather than the demands of an outbreak, particularly one where you are trying to build out the architecture as a virus is already moving through the population.
Other countries have used much-hyped digital tools during the outbreak, but in every case they have been subordinated to manual tracing. Let’s say it again: incremental, not core.
For example, South Korea has pulled on just about every tracking technology available – almost certainly too many for a directly equivalent app to overcome resistance from the UK population. As de


